An “organized armed group” is the armed wing of a non-state party to a non-international armed conflict, and may be comprised of either:

a. dissident armed forces (for example, breakaway parts of state armed forces); or
b. other organized armed groups which recruit their members primarily from the civilian population but have developed a sufficient degree of military organization to conduct hostilities on behalf of a party to the conflict.

The term organized armed group refers exclusively to the armed or military wing of a non-state party to a non-international armed conflict. It does not include those segments of the civilian population that are supportive of the non-state party such as its political wing.

See also Non-international armed conflict [1]

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Further readings:


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