N.B. As per the [disclaimer](#), neither the ICRC nor the authors can be identified with the opinions expressed in the Cases and Documents. Some cases even come to solutions that clearly violate IHL. They are nevertheless worthy of discussion, if only to raise a challenge to display more humanity in armed conflicts. Similarly, in some of the texts used in the case studies, the facts may not always be proven; nevertheless, they have been selected because they highlight interesting IHL issues and are thus published for didactic purposes.


[...] 

(b) Responsibility for War Crimes Against Prisoners

Prisoners taken in war and civilian internees are in the power of the Government which captures them. This was not always the case. For the last two centuries, however, this
position has been recognised and the customary law to this effect was formally embodied in the Hague Convention No. IV in 1907 and repeated in the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1929. Responsibility for the care of prisoners of war and of civilian internees (all of who we will refer to as “prisoners”) rests therefore with the Government having them in possession. This responsibility is not limited to the duty of mere maintenance but extends to the prevention of mistreatment. In particular, acts of inhumanity to prisoners which are forbidden by the customary law of nations as well as by conventions are to prevented [sic] by the Government having responsibility for the prisoners.

In the discharge of these duties to prisoners Governments must have resort to persons. Indeed the Governments responsible, in this sense, are those persons who direct and control the functions of Government. In this case and in the above regard we are concerned with the members of the Japanese Cabinet. The duty to prisoners is not a meaningless obligation cast upon a political abstraction. It is a specific duty to be performed in the first case by those persons who constitute the Government. In the multitude of duties and tasks involved in modern government there is of necessity an elaborate system of subdivision and delegation of duties. In the case of the duty of Governments to prisoners held by them in time of war those persons who constitute the government have the principal and continuing responsibility for their prisoners, even though they delegate the duties of maintenance and protection to others.

In general the responsibility of prisoners held by Japan may be stated to have rested upon:

1. Members of the Government;
2. Military or Naval Officers in command of formations having prisoners in their possession;
3. Officials in those departments which were concerned with the well-being of prisoners;
4. Officials, whether civilian, military, or naval, having direct and immediate control of prisoners.
It is the duty of all those on whom responsibility rests to secure proper treatment of prisoners and to prevent their ill-treatment by establishing and securing the continuous and efficient working of a system appropriate for these purposes. Such persons fail in this duty and become responsible for ill-treatment of prisoners if:

1. They fail to establish such a system.
2. If having established such a system, they fail to secure its continued and efficient working.

Each of such persons has a duty to ascertain that the system is working and if he neglects to do so he is responsible. He does not discharge his duty by merely instituting an appropriate system and thereafter neglecting to learn of its application. An Army Commander or a Minister of War, for example, must be at the same pains to ensure obedience to his orders in this respect as he would in respect of other orders he has issued on matters of the first importance.

Nevertheless, such persons are not responsible if a proper system and its continuous efficient functioning be provided for and conventional war crimes be committed unless:

1. They had knowledge that such crimes were being committed, and having such knowledge they failed to take such steps as were within their power to prevent the commission of such crimes in the future, or
2. They are at fault in having failed to acquire such knowledge.

If, such a person had, or should, but for negligence or supineness, have had such knowledge he is not excused for inaction if his Office required or permitted him to take any action to prevent such crimes. On the other hand it is not enough for the exculpation of a person, otherwise responsible, for him to show that he accepted assurances from others more directly associated with the control of prisoners if having regard to the position of those others, to the frequency of reports of such crimes, or to any other circumstances he should
have been put upon further enquiry as to whether those assurances were true or untrue. That
crimes are notorious, numerous and widespread as to time and place are matters to be
considered in imputing knowledge.

A member of a Cabinet which collectively, as one of the principal organs of the
Government, is responsible for the care of prisoners is not absolved from responsibility if,
having knowledge of the commission of the crimes in the sense already discussed, and
omitting or failing to secure the taking of measures to prevent the commission of such
crimes in the future, he elects to continue as a member of the Cabinet. This is the position
even though the Department of which he has the charge is not directly concerned with the
care of prisoners. A Cabinet member may resign. If he has knowledge of ill-treatment of
prisoners, is powerless to prevent future ill-treatment, but elects to remain in the Cabinet
thereby continuing to participate in its collective responsibility for protection of prisoners
he willingly assumes responsibility for any ill-treatment in the future.

Army or Navy Commanders can, by order, secure proper treatment and prevent ill-
treatment of prisoners. So can Ministers of War and of the Navy. If crimes are committed
against prisoners under their control, of the likely occurrence of which they had, or should
have had knowledge in advance, they are responsible for those crimes. If, for example, it be
shown that within the units under his command conventional war crimes have been
committed of which he knew or should have known, a commander who takes no adequate
steps to prevent the occurrence of such crimes in the future will be responsible for such
future crimes.

Departmental officials having knowledge of ill-treatment of prisoners are not responsible
by reason of their failure to resign; but if their functions included the administration of the
system of protection of prisoners and if they had or should had knowledge of crimes and
did nothing effective, to the extent of their powers, to prevent their occurrence in the future
then they are responsible for such future crimes.